PaperarXiv:2610.34763 · cs.SE · Oct 26, 2026
The Physical Cost of Context: Quality-Constrained Resource Accounting for Coding Agents
Zhongming Yu, Yitong Ma, Hengjia Yu, Boqin Yuan, Xiangye Lin, Hejia Zhang, Jishen Zhao
Abstract
Coding agents resend a growing context on every model call, and context policies are usually judged by the prompt tokens they save. Executed work also depends on call count and prefix reuse: a caching runtime prefills only the tokens after the longest cached prefix. A shorter prompt can therefore cost more if it rewrites cached history. Our quality-gated protocol splits executed prefill into logical prompt minus reused prefix and measures KV residency, time, and energy. On 450 localization cases derived from SWE-rebench V2, preloading ten retrieved blocks (Eager) and adding anchored history compaction (Compact) both pass a five-point non-inferiority gate. In a separate 900-cell study, Eager cuts model calls by 35.7% and the GPU-energy proxy by 33.2% against on-demand search (Grep); Compact saves nothing further. Enabling prefix caching leaves Eager's prompt volume similar (+8.3%; its 95% CI spans zero) but cuts its uncached prefill by 67.7%. Deleting history can turn a token saving into extra work. With mini-SWE-agent on 100 SWE-bench Verified instances, keeping only the last five observations (Mask-5) cuts Eager's prompt volume by 33.3% but loses 135.9k reusable tokens per task. Uncached prefill rises by 608.5%, the energy proxy by 125.6%, and the policy misses the quality gate. Policies thus save physical work by shortening the trajectory and can multiply it by editing reusable history.
Authors’ note
Accepted at the NeurIPS 2026 Workshop on Resource-Aware Agentic AI (RAAAI). 15 pages, 2 figures, 6 tables
Filed undercoding-agentsruntimeagents
Related papers
arXiv:2610.37657 · cs.LG · Oct 27, 2026
We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates. HoS learns how each head should redistribute attention between trusted and untrusted tokens, enabling models to reason over untrusted content without following injected instructions. We evaluate HoS on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B. We compare it against SecAlign++, a state-of-the-art finetuning-based defense, and ASIDE, a defense that, like ours, builds instruction-data separation into the model architecture. We show that HoS offers greater robustness to adaptive attacks, better performance on standard utility benchmarks, and matches top performance on standard agentic prompt injection benchmarks. More specifically, the black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 97% ASR against GPT-OSS-20B and 85% against SecAlign, but only 10% against HoS. Claudini, a state-of-the-art white-box attack, strengthened against HoS through autoresearch, requires 3 times more FLOPs to reach the same ASR on HoS as it does on GPT-OSS-20B or SecAlign. HoS preserves base-model utility across standard multiple-choice benchmarks and prompting setups, whereas SecAlign and ASIDE degrade in few-shot settings. On agentic benchmarks with static attacks, HoS and SecAlign perform similarly and substantially improve the security-utility trade-off over the base model. ASIDE struggles with tool use, achieving only 10% utility. These results show that prompt injection robustness can be achieved and improved through targeted attention interventions.
Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang +7
arXiv:2610.37651 · cs.CL · Oct 27, 2026
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in multi-turn agentic workloads that require sustained interaction with complex environments. Existing reflective prompt optimizers such as GEPA learn from failed rollouts, but agentic failures can also come from prompt weaknesses, harness limitations, stochastic execution, or noisy judges. We argue that such failures may not provide useful learning signal, and may even be harmful; and thus it is essential to curate which tasks are provided to the prompt optimizer for better performance. We introduce GEPA-Curator, a framework that augments the prompt optimizer to select which agent experiences should shape prompt optimization. In particular, GEPA-Curator consists of two components: task curation, which filters out tasks that are likely to provide noisy or unreliable learning signals, and prior success retrieval, which selectively retrieves past successful trajectories for a task and provides them as additional context to the prompt optimizer. We evaluate GEPA-Curator on GoBrowse, ALFWorld, AppWorld, and $τ$-bench, using both Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 5 as optimizer models. GEPA-Curator matches or exceeds the mean performance of both baselines, with gains of up to 20.7% over GEPA and 21.2% over ACE.
Zack Yu, Nicholas Lee +9
arXiv:2610.37648 · cs.LG · Oct 27, 2026
We explore how to build performant large language model (LLM) tool-use agents that complete complex, multi-step tasks. Specifically, we study how data composition in synthetically generated tool-use environments affects the training of such agents. To do so, we propose the SynthAPI pipeline, which explicitly controls the diversity of generated environments along the axes of tools, tasks, and the databases on which the tools operate. By systematically varying SynthAPI's generation controls in 458,752 tasks across 849 trained models of four different sizes, we derive a scaling law that predicts downstream tool-use agent generalization based on the scale and composition of the synthesized environments. These predictable relationships reveal several lessons for scaling tool-use agent data. As data budgets grow, scaling tool and database diversity becomes more effective than increasing the number of tasks, and increasing data complexity yields larger gains. Scaling according to these findings yields agents that outperform models trained on data from prior work in large-scale tool-use agent and synthetic environment generation across four evaluation benchmarks.
Andrew Szot, Samira Abnar +6