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Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise

Pedro H. Barcha Correia, Matheus Azevedo de Sá, Paulo H. Gomes de Senna, Giovanni Mandel Martignago, Victor Takashi Hayashi, Charles Christian Miers, Marcos A. Simplicio

Abstract

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass intended behavior and operational boundaries. In traditional chatbots, such attacks are confined to a single session because state memory is not preserved across conversations. However, persistent memory features in modern conversational interfaces enable cross-session attack propagation, establishing a threat vector known as memory injection. This work explores this emerging vulnerability in leading LLM-as-a-service platforms, highlighting its real-world severity and the need for countermeasures. While existing literature focuses on violations tailored to specific platform features, we present a general threat model. We demonstrate that all NIST attack goals are collectively achievable across ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash under this model. We also show that memory injections can exploit multiple attack vectors, including personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions, and Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected resources. Our findings reveal that all evaluated services can be manipulated to persistently spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or simulate offline unresponsiveness, even in fresh sessions. In the particular case of Claude, shared-memory features allow an attacker to compromise multiple users within an organization and also exfiltrate user prompts. To address these vulnerabilities, we derive defense mechanisms from our proposed threat model and foundational cybersecurity principles. Our analysis indicates that nearly half of these mitigations remain unimplemented across the target services. Datasets and attack artifacts are available at https://github.com/PedroBarcha/Memory-injection.

Filed undermemorymcpllm

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in multi-turn agentic workloads that require sustained interaction with complex environments. Existing reflective prompt optimizers such as GEPA learn from failed rollouts, but agentic failures can also come from prompt weaknesses, harness limitations, stochastic execution, or noisy judges. We argue that such failures may not provide useful learning signal, and may even be harmful; and thus it is essential to curate which tasks are provided to the prompt optimizer for better performance. We introduce GEPA-Curator, a framework that augments the prompt optimizer to select which agent experiences should shape prompt optimization. In particular, GEPA-Curator consists of two components: task curation, which filters out tasks that are likely to provide noisy or unreliable learning signals, and prior success retrieval, which selectively retrieves past successful trajectories for a task and provides them as additional context to the prompt optimizer. We evaluate GEPA-Curator on GoBrowse, ALFWorld, AppWorld, and $τ$-bench, using both Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 5 as optimizer models. GEPA-Curator matches or exceeds the mean performance of both baselines, with gains of up to 20.7% over GEPA and 21.2% over ACE.

Zack Yu, Nicholas Lee +9

We explore how to build performant large language model (LLM) tool-use agents that complete complex, multi-step tasks. Specifically, we study how data composition in synthetically generated tool-use environments affects the training of such agents. To do so, we propose the SynthAPI pipeline, which explicitly controls the diversity of generated environments along the axes of tools, tasks, and the databases on which the tools operate. By systematically varying SynthAPI's generation controls in 458,752 tasks across 849 trained models of four different sizes, we derive a scaling law that predicts downstream tool-use agent generalization based on the scale and composition of the synthesized environments. These predictable relationships reveal several lessons for scaling tool-use agent data. As data budgets grow, scaling tool and database diversity becomes more effective than increasing the number of tasks, and increasing data complexity yields larger gains. Scaling according to these findings yields agents that outperform models trained on data from prior work in large-scale tool-use agent and synthetic environment generation across four evaluation benchmarks.

Andrew Szot, Samira Abnar +6

When an LLM group's discussion is compressed into a short memory for a final decision maker, what should the memory keep? Two natural heuristics keep the rarest claims or the claims relevant to the decision criteria. On hidden-profile tasks both look attractive, because how widely a fact is held is confounded with whether it helps. We introduce CrossProfile, a diagnostic benchmark of 60 templates with automatically verified answer keys, in which the ownership of supporting, decoy, and irrelevant facts is crossed while their text is held fixed (480 tasks). Across Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and two DeepSeek models, both heuristics fail in predictable places. Selecting by relevance readmits decoys, because decoys are on topic: even a perfect relevance filter loses 23 to 31 points to rarest-first selection in the classic hidden-profile configuration. Rarest-first selection is no better than random selection on average and wins only where the rare facts happen to be the useful ones. In both cases accuracy follows the balance of evidence the memory keeps, not the policy that kept it. The decision model adds a third failure, a form of social proof: it gives extra weight to facts attributed to many agents. Removing the attribution tags, or reassigning them at random with line order fixed, raises accuracy in the classic configuration by 13 to 24 points. In natural discussions the evidence is lost before any memory acts: the complete transcript yields lower accuracy than no notes at all.

Anouar Imel, Imad Charradi +2