PaperarXiv:2610.31651 · cs.CV · Oct 22, 2026
BrickWright: Agentic Creation of Physically Feasible Brick Builds
Ava Pun, Kevin Dai, Sally Chen, Maxwell Jones, Ruixuan Liu, Kangle Deng, Changliu Liu, Maneesh Agrawala, Deva Ramanan, Jun-Yan Zhu
Abstract
Frontier coding agents are becoming increasingly adept at 3D modeling. Yet, they still face challenges when building objects meant to be assembled in the physical world, often creating invalid assemblies with floating, colliding, or disconnected parts. We argue that providing agents with tools for assembling builds and verifying their physical feasibility is sufficient for them to produce physically valid assemblies that still adhere to input prompts. Focusing on the domain of LEGO brick builds, we present BrickWright, a framework for generating physically feasible brick builds from text or image prompts using pre-trained agents, where a build is physically feasible if it uses only real parts, has no colliding or floating parts, and forms a connected structure if possible. BrickWright guides agents to create builds by writing code with BrickLayer, a Python toolkit with two main components: an ergonomic brick assembly API that halves inference cost compared to working in raw LDraw, and a validator that provides feedback on physical feasibility. Whereas baseline agents achieve physical validity rates ranging from only 9% (GPT-6 Luna) to 69% (GPT-6 Astra), BrickWright-guided agents achieve 100% validity on a sample of 512 prompts, while improving prompt adherence for lightweight agents and maintaining it for stronger agents. Additionally, they outperform specialized models on the text-to-brick task. Code is available on our project page: https://avalovelace1.github.io/brickwright/
Filed undercoding-agentsagents
Related papers
arXiv:2610.37657 · cs.LG · Oct 27, 2026
We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates. HoS learns how each head should redistribute attention between trusted and untrusted tokens, enabling models to reason over untrusted content without following injected instructions. We evaluate HoS on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B. We compare it against SecAlign++, a state-of-the-art finetuning-based defense, and ASIDE, a defense that, like ours, builds instruction-data separation into the model architecture. We show that HoS offers greater robustness to adaptive attacks, better performance on standard utility benchmarks, and matches top performance on standard agentic prompt injection benchmarks. More specifically, the black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 97% ASR against GPT-OSS-20B and 85% against SecAlign, but only 10% against HoS. Claudini, a state-of-the-art white-box attack, strengthened against HoS through autoresearch, requires 3 times more FLOPs to reach the same ASR on HoS as it does on GPT-OSS-20B or SecAlign. HoS preserves base-model utility across standard multiple-choice benchmarks and prompting setups, whereas SecAlign and ASIDE degrade in few-shot settings. On agentic benchmarks with static attacks, HoS and SecAlign perform similarly and substantially improve the security-utility trade-off over the base model. ASIDE struggles with tool use, achieving only 10% utility. These results show that prompt injection robustness can be achieved and improved through targeted attention interventions.
Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang +7
arXiv:2610.37651 · cs.CL · Oct 27, 2026
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in multi-turn agentic workloads that require sustained interaction with complex environments. Existing reflective prompt optimizers such as GEPA learn from failed rollouts, but agentic failures can also come from prompt weaknesses, harness limitations, stochastic execution, or noisy judges. We argue that such failures may not provide useful learning signal, and may even be harmful; and thus it is essential to curate which tasks are provided to the prompt optimizer for better performance. We introduce GEPA-Curator, a framework that augments the prompt optimizer to select which agent experiences should shape prompt optimization. In particular, GEPA-Curator consists of two components: task curation, which filters out tasks that are likely to provide noisy or unreliable learning signals, and prior success retrieval, which selectively retrieves past successful trajectories for a task and provides them as additional context to the prompt optimizer. We evaluate GEPA-Curator on GoBrowse, ALFWorld, AppWorld, and $τ$-bench, using both Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 5 as optimizer models. GEPA-Curator matches or exceeds the mean performance of both baselines, with gains of up to 20.7% over GEPA and 21.2% over ACE.
Zack Yu, Nicholas Lee +9
arXiv:2610.37648 · cs.LG · Oct 27, 2026
We explore how to build performant large language model (LLM) tool-use agents that complete complex, multi-step tasks. Specifically, we study how data composition in synthetically generated tool-use environments affects the training of such agents. To do so, we propose the SynthAPI pipeline, which explicitly controls the diversity of generated environments along the axes of tools, tasks, and the databases on which the tools operate. By systematically varying SynthAPI's generation controls in 458,752 tasks across 849 trained models of four different sizes, we derive a scaling law that predicts downstream tool-use agent generalization based on the scale and composition of the synthesized environments. These predictable relationships reveal several lessons for scaling tool-use agent data. As data budgets grow, scaling tool and database diversity becomes more effective than increasing the number of tasks, and increasing data complexity yields larger gains. Scaling according to these findings yields agents that outperform models trained on data from prior work in large-scale tool-use agent and synthetic environment generation across four evaluation benchmarks.
Andrew Szot, Samira Abnar +6